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Reforming Educator Compensation
By Michael Podgursky
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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While compensation accounts for
roughly 90 percent of K-12
instructional costs, there is little
evidence of efficient or strategic
design in these systems. Rigid salary
schedules reward factors generally
unrelated to effectiveness, induce
field shortages, and encourage
inequitable allocation of
professional staff. Deferred
compensation systems impose sharp
penalties on mobility, promote early
retirement and generate large
unfunded liabilities. Serious
attempts to bring greater efficiencies
to K-12 spending and raising
teacher quality must confront the
dysfunctional compensation system.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 2012-13 school year, the
most current year for which national
data are available, U.S. public
schools spent $218 billion for
salaries and $84 billion for benefits
for instructional personnel. These
compensation payments accounted
for 56 percent of K-12 current
expenditures and 90 percent of
instructional expenditures (U.S.
Department of Education, 2016).
As large as these expenditures are,
they do not fully capture the
resources committed to K-12
compensation. They do not, for
example, include hundreds of
billions of dollars of unfunded
liabilities of pension funds and
retiree health insurance for teachers
and administrators (Rauh, 2017).
Since compensation costs for
teachers consumes such a large
share of the K-12 education dollar,
even small gains in productivity can
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have substantial effects on overall
costs or performance. In this essay
I agrue that there is ample reason to
believe that substantial efficiency
gains can be found, where we define
efficiency as improvements in
educational output – variously
measured as total students served,
graduation rates, test performance –
per dollar of spending.
Educator compensation “systems”
are not rationally planned nor are
they integrated in any systematic or
strategic way. In any well-run
organization, the total compensation
package – salaries, current and
deferred benefits – should be
structured with an eye toward
overall firm performance.
Tradeoffs between different types of
salaries and benefits would be
carefully scrutinized. Not only the
level, but the structure of salaries
would take account of market
benchmarks—what others are being
paid for comparable jobs—and
productivity. In public education,
however, teacher compensation
packages arise not out of a rational
planning process, but rather from an
amalgam of different components
or “silos.” This silos reflect
pressures from different
constituencies, legislative mandates,
legacies from earlier vintages of
collective bargaining agreements,
and other institutional and political
factors. More importantly, they too
often arise with little or no
consideration for overall efficiency.
In general, teacher pay is largely set
by salary schedules that have
evolved over decades of collective
bargaining agreements or, in many
non-bargaining states, legislative fiat.
Base pay is augmented by various
1
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types of district or state-wide salary
supplements (e.g., coaching, career
ladder). Deferred compensation in
the form of retirement pay inhabits
another silo altogether, with policy
set by statewide pension boards
often dominated by senior
educators and administrators.
Teacher compensation is the sum of
all of these parts, plus fringe
benefits, such as health insurance,
which typically negotiated at the
district level.
The purpose of this paper is to
identify several key inefficiencies of
the teacher compensation system
and suggests some principles for
reform. To accomplish this, the
paper is set out as follows. In
section 2 we examine national and
Missouri trends in school staffing.
Sections 3-5 focus on the structure
of teacher compensation in terms of
salary, wage-setting units, and
retirement benefits. Concluding
remarks are found in Section 6.
With an eye toward the conditions
in Missouri, our survey of the
teacher compensation suggests that
market-based reforms of teacher
compensation would increase
efficiency of K-12 spending and
improve school performance.1

Corcoran, and Mishel, (2004), for
example, compare teachers to other
professionals such as lawyers,
nurses, or managers.
Comparisons of public school
teacher pay to non-teacher pay are
fraught with difficulties, however.
The most obvious one is that
teachers have a shorter work day
and work year compared to those
other occupations. Teachers also
have a larger share of pay in the
form of benefits; in particular,
teachers generally enjoy very
generous health insurance and
retirement benefits. The most
careful study to date comparing
public school teachers to nonteachers finds that that the generous
benefit package for teachers (which
we will discuss further below),
readily trumps salary differentials for
comparably educated private-sector
workers. The result is that public
school teachers as a group enjoy a
total level of salary and benefits that
easily matches or exceeds similarly
educated private sector employees
(Richwine and Biggs, 2011).
The relevant point for this paper is
that the level of average teacher pay

is determined by the decisions of
school administrators, who through
their actions seem to favor more
rather than better remunerated
teachers. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate
this point. In Figure 1 we report the
student-teacher ratio in the United
States and in Missouri between 1990
and the present. Both curves show
a general downward trend, one that
occurred for decades prior to 1990
(Podgursky, 2010; Hanushek, 1986).
There is a notable uptick during the
recent recession. Figure 2 reports
the ratio of students to total school
staff (i.e., teachers, counselors,
administrators, and nonprofessional staff) in the United
States and Missouri. Again, the
trend is downward, with Missouri
schools employing more staff per
student than the national average.
In the most recent available data,
Missouri public schools had 7.2
students per full time equivalent
(FTE) staff on the payroll,
compared with 7.9 in 1990.
The tradeoff between staff and pay
is straightforward. Since 1990,
Missouri operating spending per
student grew by 126 percent, or 3.6

2. TEACHER QUALITY
VERSUS TEACHER
QUANTITY
One common response to
discussions of justifying teacher
compensation reform is that the
level rather that the structure of pay
is the problem. In this view,
teachers as a group are “underpaid”
and that is the primary problem to
be fixed. Advocates of this view
usually point to salaries in other
occupations (rather than teacher
salaries in private K-12 schools ) in
making this case. Allegreto,
PODGURSKY
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higher pay. In this regard there is
nothing unique about Missouri: A
too similar quantity-over-quality
story holds nationally as well.

percent annually. By contrast, over
the same period, teacher salaries
grew by only 65 percent (2.2 percent
annually), from $28,286 to $46,750
(Table 1). When spending per
student rises by a given amount, say
five percent, other things being
equal, school administrators face
three possible reactions: They can
raise teacher pay by five percent and
hold staffing ratios constant; they
can hold teacher pay constant and
lower staffing ratios by five percent;
or any combination of the two that
adds up to five percent. If Missouri
schools had maintained the (already
low) staffing ratios of 1990 and
devoted the rising revenue per
student to teacher salaries, average
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teacher pay in Missouri would have
been $64,045, or 37 percent higher.
Further, if Missouri schools took
the additional step of raising the
Missouri student-teacher ratio to the
US average, teacher pay would rise
an additional 23 percent off of the
2013 base to $74,719. Surveying
behavior over recent decades, and in
spite of much public discourse
about “teacher quality,” it’s clear
that Missouri school administrators
favored a policy of increasing the
number of teachers they employ
over improving teacher
compensation and, one would
assume, the potential to improve
teacher quality that goes along with

There are a variety of competing
scholarly hypotheses about why
schools made this choice. Some
have argued that this reflects
consumer preferences for smaller
classes (Flyer and Rosen, 1997).
There is some research suggesting
that smaller class sizes can improve
student learning outcomes,
however, there is a great deal of
slippage between class size and
student-teacher ratios.2 Others
point to union preferences for
overstaffing (Ehrenberg and Smith,
1991). The opportunity cost of this
strategy, as pointed out by current
research on teacher value-added, is
that many teachers with low
classroom effectiveness have been
drawn into public school
classrooms. If schools shed the
least effective teachers and modestly
increased class size, it would be
possible to raise the pay of the
remaining teachers and increase
overall workforce effectiveness
(Hanushek, 2009).
3. WHAT PUBLIC SCHOOLS
REWARD: THE SINGLE
SALARY SCHEDULE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
Whether the average teacher salary
is $47,000 or $75,000, the question
remains: What factors are rewarded
in entry-level salaries and over a
teaching career? The answer,
unfortunately, is that both entry and
career salaries are driven by rigid
salary schedules that are not marketbased. These salary schedules—
usually referred to as “single salary
schedules”—are a nearly universal
feature of public school districts.
Pay for teachers (and principals) in
public school districts is largely
determined by these schedules. In
3
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large school districts the pay of
thousands of teachers in hundreds
of schools—from kindergarten up
to secondary teachers in math and
science—is set by a single districtwide schedule. The use of such
district-wide schedules is nearly
universal in public school districts.
The U.S. Deptarement of Education
reports that 96 percent of public
school districts accounting for
nearly 100 percent of teachers
report use of a salary schedule
(Podgursky, 2007). Comparable
survey data are not available for
principals, but even a casual
inspection of school district web
sites suggests that they are
ubiquitous for school leaders as
well.3
To illustrate such a salary schedule,
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Table 2 provides an example, one
based on that used for Saint Louis
public school teachers. The rows
and columns refer to years of
experience and levels of teacher
education, respectively. Note that
the pay increases associated with
higher levels of education may be
for training not directly associated
with a teacher’s actual classroom
assignments. For example, it is
common for teachers to earn
additional remuneration for
graduate credits and degrees in
education administration while they
are still employed full time as
classroom teachers. Nearly all other
school districts in Missouri and
nationwide employ such schedules.4
These teacher salary schedules are
sometimes referred to as “single

salary schedules,” a term reflecting
their historical development as an
elementary and secondary school
pay scheme (Kershaw and McKean,
1962). Since elementary school
teachers were nearly all women
whereas high school teachers were
mostly male, early struggles for a
single salary schedule were seen by
some as an important part of
feminist struggle for pay equity
(Murphy, 1990). The eventual
unification of schedules for
elementary and secondary school
teachers was embraced by the
National Education Association and
the American Federation of
Teachers. Once a unified front was
established, such schedules were
embedded in nearly every collective
bargaining agreement and, in some
cases, state legislation.

4
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These salary schedules for teachers
contrast with how pay is determined
in most other professions. In
medicine, what doctors and nurses
earn varies by specialty, such as
surgeons relative to general
practitioners. Even within the same
hospital or HMO, pay will differ by
specialty field. In universities there
are large differences in pay between
faculty by teaching fields, i.e.,
business compared to the liberal
arts. And faculty pay structures in
most higher education institutions
are flexible, adjusting much more
rapidly to changes in the market. It
is not uncommon for institutions to
match counter-offers for more
successful faculty whom they wish
to retain. Merit or performancebased pay is commonplace. Ballou
and Podgursky (1997) and Ballou
(2001) report generally similar
findings for private K-12 education.
Even when private schools report
that they use a salary schedule for
teacher pay, payments "off
schedule" are commonplace.

increase in education does not seem
to improve teacher productivity in
the classroom, salary steps and
advanced-education bonuses add
substantially to instructional costs.
Roza (2007) estimates that 12
percent of per pupil spending is
absorbed by salary schedule
payments for experience and MA
degrees alone.

3.1 What Clears The Market For
Teachers
There is a popular aphorism in
economics: “You can’t repeal the
law of supply and demand.” By this
economists mean that if price is not
allowed to clear a market something
else will. In our context, if salaries
are not allowed to clear the market
for teachers, then the market will
clear in other ways. We now
consider several of the
consequences of rigid salary
schedules for school staffing.

3.1.A Single salary schedule
suppresses pay differentials by
teaching field.
All teachers in a district with the
same experience or education level
earn the same base pay. A second
grade teacher will earn the same
base pay as a high school chemistry
teacher. Given the major
differences in human capital
investments by teaching field (e.g.,
elementary education versus
secondary physical science) it is
almost certainly the case that nonteaching opportunity earnings differ
greatly as well.
National data on teacher recruiting
bear this out. The data, reported in
Table 3, are from the 1999-00 and
2007-08 Schools and Staffing
Surveys (SASS). These are
assessments of market conditions by
administrators who have recently

Rigid salary schedules might have
some efficiency rationale if the
factors rewarded—teacher
experience and graduate
education—were strong predictors
of teacher productivity. However,
surveys of the education production
literature find no support for a
positive effect of teacher graduate
degrees. Of 41 studies investigating
the “value-added” of the effect of
education levels on teacher
effectiveness (primarily Master’s
degrees), Hanushek (2003) reports
that not a single study found a
statistically significant positive
effect: greater education levels do
not improve teacher productivity.
In fact, 10 of the studies actually
found negative effects.
Furthermore, teacher experience has
little effect of productivity beyond
the first few years (Hanushek and
Rivkin, 2004). But while this
PODGURSKY
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recruited teachers in these fields.
Respondents were asked to rate how
difficult or easy it was to fill a
vacancy in the field. In 2007-08, 74
percent of school administrators
reported that it was “easy” to fill
vacancies in elementary education,
with just four percent reporting it
“very difficult” or that they could
not fill the position. The situation
changes dramatically when we turn
to math, science, and special
education, where a large share of
districts reported it was “very
difficult” or they were unable to fill
a vacancy. These patterns also
prevailed in high poverty schools.
While low poverty schools reported
greater ease in recruiting,
nonetheless 63 percent of high
poverty schools reported it easy to
fill vacancies in elementary
education.5
Further evidence on this point may
be found by examining the nonteaching earnings of former teachers
after they have left the profession.
Former elementary school teachers
(on average) earned less than
secondary school teachers in their
non-teaching pursuits. Among
former secondary teachers, those
who taught in technical fields earned
more than those in non-technical
fields (Goldhaber and Player, 2005).
In a market with flexible wages,
earnings of elementary teachers
would fall relative to science, math,
and special education teachers.
However, district salary schedules
do not permit this relative wage
adjustment to occur. Thus, the
market “clears” in terms of quality
rather than price. Numerous
reports have documented the extent
of “teaching out of field,” or
teachers practicing with substandard
licenses in the fields of science,
math, and special education, while
over 95 percent of elementary
school teachers are fully licensed in
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elementary education (U.S.
Department of Education, 2004b).
The ubiquitous salary schedule
reflects a deeper problem of
personnel policy in public schools.
Policy makers, as well as many
researchers, tend to treat K-12
teachers as a single occupation.
From a labor market or human
resources perspective, this is not a
useful aggregation. The training,
working conditions, and nonteaching opportunities of a second
grade teacher are very different
from those of a high school
chemistry teacher. Yet, for
purposes of policy and in many
research studies they are grouped
into a single occupation: teachers.
This is in stark contrast to the
market for college professors. In
most policy contexts it would make
little sense to talk about the labor
market for “professors.” This
market varies dramatically by field
(as reflected in starting pay, for
example). The “market” for finance
professors is very different than for
English professors. But the
homogenization of public school
teachers is encouraged in part by the
collective bargaining process, which
puts all teachers in a school district,
regardless of the level of school or
their teaching field, into a single
“bargaining unit” with uniform pay
schedules and other personnel rules.
However, we do not want to
overstate the collective bargaining
effect. It is still true that single
salary schedules are the norm even
in states like Missouri where some
districts that do not engage in
collective bargaining.

3.1.B The single salary schedule
suppresses differentials by
schools within districts.
In larger urban districts dozens or
even hundreds of schools are

covered by the same salary schedule.
The working environments for
teachers often vary greatly between
schools in the same district. Some
may be dangerous places to work,
whereas other schools offer more
pleasant and attractive worksites.
Teachers in the less desirable
schools often are able to use their
seniority to transfer to a more
pleasant school. Or, they may
simply resign at a higher rate. In
either case, the result is that students
in high poverty schools will on
average have less experienced (and
less educated) teachers. Because the
salary schedule assigns lower pay to
teachers with less experience within
a school district, an unintended
consequence of a district-wide salary
schedule is lower spending per
student in high-poverty schools
(Roza, et.al, 2007; Iatarola and
Stiefel, 2003).
High poverty schools also will have
relatively more novice or
inexperienced teachers. One fairly
consistent finding in the “teacher
effects” literature is that students
taught by novice or inexperienced
teachers record lower achievement
gains than students with more
experienced teachers (e.g.,
Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, and
Rivkin, 2005; Aaronson, Barrow,
and Sander, 2007; Boyd, et.al.,
2006). Lankford, Loeb, and
Wyckoff (2002) examine the
allocation of teachers in New York
City and find that children in high
poverty schools are more likely to
be exposed to novice teachers.
Again, this is an intra-NYC
allocation problem, one that is
clearly exacerbated by a uniform
salary schedule across all schools.
Closer to home, Podgursky (2008)
examines an administrative data set
with the universe of public
elementary schools in Missouri. He
finds that children in high poverty
6
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schools are more likely to be
exposed to novice teachers, but this
is entirely due to the intra-district
allocation of teachers. To return to
our market-clearing thesis, if the
attractiveness of working conditions
varies among schools within a
district, then equalizing teacher pay
disequalizes teacher quality. In
order to equalize teacher quality,
one needs to disequalize teacher
pay.

3.1.C Single Salary Schedules
Lead to Equalization of Pay
Regardless of Teacher
Effectiveness.
A consistent finding in the literature
is that there is a very large variation
in teacher effectiveness (e.g., Rivkin,
Hanushek, and Kain, 2005;
Aaronson, Barnow, and Sander,
2007). Even within the same school
building, some fourth grade teachers
are much more effective at raising
student achievement than other
fourth grade teachers. Some
teachers are harder working and
elicit greater effort from students
than others, while other teachers
may be “burnt out” and simply
putting in time until retirement
(more on pension system incentives
below). The single salary schedule
suppresses differences between
more effective and less effective
teachers (however defined).
Rewarding more effective teachers
on the basis of performance would
have two important consequences.
The first is a motivation effect.
Incumbent teachers would have an
incentive to work harder to raise
whatever performance measure is
rewarded. The second is a selection
effect. Over the longer term,
performance pay would draw
teachers into the workforce who are
relatively more effective at meeting
the performance targets and would
also help retain such
PODGURSKY

teachers(Podgursky and Springer,
2007). Economic theory predicts
(correctly) that over time, equalizing
teacher pay among teachers of
different effectiveness will tend to
lower the overall quality and
performance of the teaching
workforce.
4. CONFOUNDING
FACTORS: TENURE AND
THE SIZE OF WAGESETTING UNITS
The costs associated with rigid
teacher salary schedules are
amplified by two other features of
K-12 human resource policy: tenure
and the size of wage-setting units
(i.e., districts).
Consider first the effect of teacher
tenure. Even if experience per se
does not raise a teacher’s
effectiveness, in principle a
seniority-based wage structure might
be efficient if less effective teachers
are weeded out over time through
contract non-renewal.
Unfortunately, personnel policies in
traditional public schools preclude
such an effect. Teachers in
traditional public school districts
receive automatic contract renewal
(tenure) after two to five years on
the job (five years in Missouri).
After receiving tenure, it is very
difficult to dismiss a teacher for
poor job performance, a finding
which has been widely documented
(Bridges, 1992; Hess and West,
2006). The presence of teacher
tenure laws and collective bargaining
language, which further hampers
dismissal of low-performing
teachers, thus makes the economic
costs associated with single salary
schedules even greater.
The other factor that increases the
cost of rigid district salary schedules
is the size of wage-setting units.
Other things equal, the larger the

size of the unit the greater the
economic cost of rigid salary
schedules. The wage-setting unit in
private and charter schools is
typically the school. In traditional
public schools, wage-setting is done
at the district level. In fact, most
personnel policy concerning
teachers—the the level and structure
of teacher pay, benefits, and
recruiting—is centralized at the
district level in traditional public
schools.
This policy of centralizing
policymaking has two effects. First,
it makes the market for teachers less
flexible and less competitive.
Consider a district with 50 schools.
Rather than let 10 “sub-districts”
set pay for five schools and compete
with one another for talent, a single
employer sets pay for all 50 schools.
At least the 10 smaller districts
could compete with one another
and adjust their schedules to best
meet their own internal
circumstances.
A second consequence of large
wage setting-units is that the wagesetting process becomes more
bureaucratic and less amenable to
merit or market adjustments at the
individual level (Podgursky, 2010).
The size distribution of these
districts in terms of teacher
employment is very highly skewed,
with the consequence that most
teachers are employed in large
school districts. Nationally, one
quarter of teachers in traditional
public schools are employed in
districts with at least 2,100 full-time
equivalent (FTE) teachers, and half
of traditional public school teachers
are in districts with at least 561 FTE
teachers. Thus, the typical teacher
finds herself in a large organization
with standardized, bureaucratic
wage-setting. By contrast, the
average charter school—an
independent employer—employs
7
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just 16 FTE teachers, barely larger
than the average private school (15
FTE teachers).
In principle, public school districts
need not be so bureaucratic. They
could (should) adopt more
decentralized systems of personnel
policy, give school principals more
control over teacher recruitment
and pay, and adopt more of a team
model. The fact that one observes
wage-setting in private schools,
including Catholic dioceses,
following a more decentralized
model suggests that there are few
efficiency gains to be had from
centralization of compensation.
This highlights an important
difference between traditional public
and charter or private schools. The
percent of teachers covered by
collective bargaining agreements in
charter schools is far lower than in
traditional public schools. And for
private schools, it is virtually nil
(Podgursky, 2010). The absence of
a binding collective bargaining
agreement is an important source of
personnel flexibility in private and
charter schools. Teacher unions in
general have been opposed to more
flexible market- or performancebased pay systems. In addition,
collective bargaining laws, by
treating the district as the
“appropriate bargaining unit,” have
tended to push personnel policy and
wage-setting to the larger district
level and lock them there.

others who spend their career in
public service. This mix of current
versus deferred income was
rationalized by the contention that
the public good was best served by
the longevity of service that would
be induced by these pension plans.6
In recent decades, however,
increasing amounts of evidence
have shown that many of these
plans, both in the private and public
sector, may actually have shortened
rather than lengthened professional
careers by encouraging early
retirements.7
The cost side of teacher retirement
benefits affects the market for
teachers by driving a wedge between
the amount paid by employers and
the take-home pay received by
teachers. In Missouri, the combined
contributions of teachers and school
districts for retirement benefits in
the state teacher retirement plan
have risen steadily from 20 percent

of salary in 2004 to 29 percent
today. The costs of school retiree
benefits, including "legacy" costs
from unfunded benefits for
previous retirees, consume a
growing share of K-12 budgets.
Figure 3 shows employer costs for
retirement and Social Security for
teachers and private sector
managers and professionals based
on data collected by the U.S.
Department of Labor. Benefit rates
for professionals in private firms
have been relatively flat at about 10
percent of salaries since 2004. By
contrast, teachers’ costs have risen
from about 12 to 15 percent of
payroll over the same period. As a
result, the gap in retirement benefit
costs as a percent of salaries
widened from 1.9 to 10.7 percent of
earnings or $1220 per student,
which is roughly 10.5 percent of per
pupil operating expenditures (Figure
4)

5. DEFERRED
COMPENSATION: TEACHER
PENSION INCENTIVES
Pensions have long been an
important part of total
compensation for teachers in public
schools. Traditionally, it has been
argued, salaries have been relatively
low, while pension benefits have
been relatively high for teachers and
PODGURSKY
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Second, a comparison of employer
contributions significantly
understates the value of pension
benefits accrued by teachers as
compared to private sector
professionals. Richwine and Biggs
(2011) point out that the teacher
contributions are implicitly
guaranteed a much higher return
(about eight percent) than the risk
free rate available to private sector
professionals investing in individual
retirement accounts (roughly four
percent). When this differential is
applied to contributions and
compounded over a work life, it
produces a huge differential in
pension wealth at retirement.
Taking this differential return into
account, Biggs and Richwine
estimate that the pension wealth
generated by one percent of salary
for public school teachers would
require nearly three percent of salary
for private sector professionals.
This implicit guarantee of a high
yield to employer and employee
contributions plays an important
role in Richwine and Biggs’s finding
that, on average, the total
compensation of public school
teachers exceeds that of private
sector professionals.

Figure 3 understates the actual gap
in retirement benefits for two
reasons. First, the BLS data do not
include employer contributions for
retiree health insurance, which are
substantial in some states and
PODGURSKY

districts, but have all but
disappeared in the private sector.
While these vary by state and
district, Richwine and Biggs (2011)
estimate them to be roughly eight
percent of earnings.

An important research question is
the effect of these retirement
benefits systems on the teaching
workforce. Costrell and Podgursky
(2009,2010) find that the pattern of
pension wealth accrual in teacher
defined benefit systems creates
strong incentives to pull teachers to
a given age and then push them out
of the workforce afterward, with the
push encouraging teachers to retire
at relatively early ages by economy
wide standards. This is illustrated
by the data in Figure 5. These
pension systems also impose very
large costs on mobile teachers.
Several studies find that pension
rules strongly affect the timing of
9
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teacher retirement behavior (among
others, Ferguson, et. al. (2006),
Brown, 2009; Costrell and McGee,
2009; Ni and Podgursky, 2016). A
recent paper examining Missouri
teacher salary schedules by districts
finds a substantial disequalizing
effects from the pension annuity
formula favoring wealthier districts
with steeper salary schedules (Shuls,
2017).
It is difficult to discern an efficiency
rationale for heavily back-loaded
pension wealth accrual and mobility
penalties. The fairly massive back
loading of benefits might be
justified if there were (was?)
evidence of large returns to
experience and important job
specific human capital investments.
However, the majority of empirical
studies of teacher effectiveness find
that novice teachers (e.g., teachers
with less than three years of
experience) on average are less
effective than more senior teachers,
but thereafter the returns to
experience level off quickly. There
is little evidence that a teacher with
20 years’ experience is any more
effective in the classroom than a
teacher with 10 years’ experience.
Ironically, the current pension
system, by pushing many teachers
into early retirement, actually raises
the steady-state share of novice
teachers in the workforce and in
turn lowers overall teacher
effectiveness.
Turning from the timing of teacher
retirement to workforce quality and
teacher staffing, the literature on
teachers is slimmer still, but
growing. Koedel and Podgursky
(2012) find no evidence that the
“pull” of the back-loaded pension
benefits raises teacher quality, as
measured by student achievement
gains. They find that the “push”
effect tends to induce more
effective teachers to retire earlier
PODGURSKY

than they otherwise would.
Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim (2014)
analyze an early retirement bonus in
Illinois and find that when early
retirements by teachers near
conventional retirement ages were
incentivized, student achievement
rose. This suggests that the “pull”
incentives in these plans are holding
in less effective teachers. Regarding
mobility penalties, Kim, et. al.
(2017a) find that schools that
operate near state (and thus
pension) borders have lower
performance outcomes than similar
schools operating “inland.” This
finding suggests that frictions
associated with state borders
(licensing and pension mobility
penalties) impede efficient operation
of markets for teachers.
To summarize, the traditional
teacher pension plans are
increasingly costly, provide strong
incentives for early retirement, and
impose large penalties for teacher
mobility. There is little evidence
that these incentives improve
workforce quality. Indeed, the
virtual disappearance of these types
of defined-benefit pension plans for
private sector professionals, in favor
of mobile 401k or 403b type plans,
suggests that they are not effective
tools for HR tools for educated,
young professionals.
6. CONCLUSION: SOME
PRINCIPLES FOR
COMPENSATION REFORM
When it comes to reform,
accountability pressures are starting
to force school districts to address
the inefficiencies in such a
compensation system and rethink
how they are spending roughly $300
billion annually in compensation of
instructional personnel. Federal
programs in the United States , such
as the Teacher Incentive Fund
(TIF), are encouraging states to

experiment with performance and
market-based pay. Minnesota,
Florida, and Texas have developed
programs to encourage their
districts to develop such programs.
A number of large urban districts,
most notably Denver, also have
taken important steps in this
direction. Performance and marketbased incentives are much more
common in charter schools and are
expanding with the charter school
base. They are also more common
in private schools and may expand
as well if private school choice
programs are expanded.
Rather than conclude this study with
a laundry list of reforms, I focus
instead on some general economic
principles that should guide reform.
In this regard, it is important to
recognize that the information
necessary to implement personnel
policies in education is highly
decentralized. In general, regulators
in state education departments lack
information on teacher quality or
performance. They can monitor
teacher credentials but not the
localized and often classroomspecific information that adds up to
effective individual teaching and
exemplary contribution to team
activities in the school.8 This
suggests several general principles.
1. Focus accountability on student
learning. The focus of
regulation should be on what
state regulators can measure—
student learning—and not on
what they can’t—teacher
quality. Teacher performance
and effort are localized data.
State regulators can monitor
teacher credentials but they
lack more detailed information
on teacher quality or
performance. Value-added
measures at the teacher or
school level can be provided to
school administrators, but
10
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decisions about how to use the
data should be left to local
decision makers. It is
important that school districts
face the right incentives to
make the best use of these data.
This can take the form of topdown state accountability
systems or bottom-up school
choice programs, or some
combination of the two.
Whatever the mix, all
stakeholders--parents,
taxpayers, educators—should
be provided with extensive data
on school and district
performance outcomes in order
to increase visibility in the
market.
2. Provide “regulatory space” for
experimentation. To the extent
possible, school district
administrators (and charter
school leaders) should be
provided with the opportunity
to experiment with alternative
compensation policies. Instead
of a single-minded application
of single salary schedules as is
common today, this “space”
must include the capacity for
local administrators to
renegotiate collective
bargaining agreements, deviate
from state-wide teacher salary
schedules where they exist, and
implement alternative benefit
packages. Governor Walker’s
restriction of the latitude of
bargaining in Wisconsin
provides an example of how
changes in the scope of
bargaining in collective
bargaining law, and thus an
expansion of management
prerogatives can help bring
down fringe benefit costs
(Costrell, 2012).
One of the most rigid and
immobile components of
educator compensation systems
are statewide teacher pension
PODGURSKY

systems. Some states have
allowed charter schools to opt
out of state teacher pension
plans (Olberg and Podgursky,
2011). Unfortunately, Missouri
is not one of those states. This
flexibility should be extended
to charters in all states. In
addition, individual school
districts should be allowed to
experiment with employment
tracks that avoid the statewide
plans entirely. In that way, new
teacher recruits should be able
to choose between traditional
defined benefit retirement
plans and portable defined
contribution plans as they can
in Florida, Ohio, and Utah.
Provide incentives for districts
to experiment. As noted
above, the federal TIF program
provides competitive grants for
districts to experiment with
educator incentive plans. A
few states have set up similar
competitive grant programs:
Examples include Procomp in
Minnesota and DATE in
Texas. Given the particular
circumstances of school
districts, regulators should
avoid the temptation to
micromanage. Efficient
market-based compensation
reforms for a rural Texas
school district may be very
different from the those for
Dallas or Houston.
3. Reform the training of school
administrators. It is
commonplace, and more than a
little self-serving, for those of
us in the education industry to
identify “more education” as
the solution to any problem.
That said, economists who
work with school
administrators are likely to
encounter a disconcerting
absence of, and aversion to,
economic reasoning regarding

resource allocation and
personnel economics. If states
required an MBA rather than
graduate training in education
administration from schools of
education for certifying school
leaders, the single salary
schedule would likely have
been discarded long ago.
A fundamental long-term reform is
to improve the training and
selection of school administrators.
In particular, it would be useful to
have school administrators who
have learned the basics of
compensation design and personnel
economics and are willing to put
these ideas into practice. If not
requiring an MBA, at a minimum
textbooks on personnel economics,
such as Lazear and Gibbs (2008)—
widely used in top MBA
programs—should be part of the
curriculum in educator
administration programs as well.
Unfortunately, the standards of the
professional community in this
regard (National Policy Board for
Education Administration, 2002)
make no explicit mention of training
in these areas, but form the basis for
accreditation of school
administrator training programs. If
existing programs are unwilling to
incorporate such additional training
into their curriculum, provision
should be made for “alternative
route” education administrator
programs that permit entry of more
entrepreneurial school leaders and
equip their students with modern
management tools.
Michael Podgursky is professor of
economics at the University of Missouri at
Columbia.
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NOTES
Unless otherwise indicated, throughout
this paper the term “teacher” is assumed to
mean a public K-12 teacher.
1

The research on class size has largely
focused on the lower elementary grades
(e.g., K-3). Low student teacher ratios does
not necessarily mean low elementary class
sizes. For example, during the 2011-12
school year the average class size in
elementary schools was 21.6 students, while
the student teacher ratio was roughly 16
(https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/s
ass1112_2013314_t1s_007.asp). School
administrators may use favorable staffing
ratios to provide teachers with more time
out during the day. Schools may use the
additional teaching staff for other types of
classes with small enrollments, special
education, or tutoring assignments, pull-out
classes, to take but a few examples.
2

Some states that have statewide schedules
for teachers also have schedules for
principals. The statewide (minimum) salary
schedule for principals in North Carolina
may be found here.
3

Other Missouri schedules are available at
the Missouri State Teachers Association
website. A database of salary schedules for
large US school districts are maintained by
the National Council on Teacher Quality.
4

Podgursky (2010). For updated data from
these surveys see Cowen, et.al. (2016).
5

NEA, 1995, p. 3. As the NEA report
points out, however, this purpose has
“been lost for many in the mists of time,”
and “many pension administrators would
be hard-pressed to give an account of why
their systems are structured as is except to
say that ‘the Legislature did it’ or ‘It is a
result of bargaining.’”
6

Friedberg and Webb (2005) showed that
the private sector shift toward defined
contribution plans contributed to the rise
of retirement ages since the 1980s. With
regard to teachers, Harris and Adams
(2007) find considerably higher rates of
labor force exit at ages 56-64 than in
comparable professions, as well as evidence
that this is due to their pension coverage.
7

A useful reference in this regard is Hayek
(1945).
8
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